



## **THE DERELICTION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN EGYPT: A CASE STUDY OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

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### **Abstract**

To date, the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood had brought sociological and political scholars to seek the reason behind the movement's collapse. Whilst some scholars assume that the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood had ultimately led to the collapse of political Islam. Other scholars argue that the Muslim Brotherhood had governed Egypt for a year solely. Thus, the movement had no influence on the state of the apparatus to implement the agenda of political Islam. This article examines the political incidents during the Muslim Brotherhood government to seek the reason behind the movement's collapse. The article provides a critical analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood agenda. It also answers three main questions: how Egyptians rebuffed political Islam? Who incited the Egyptians against the Muslim Brotherhood? Was Egyptians prepared for democracy beneath political Islam?

**Keywords:** Political Islam, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Military.

### **Introduction**

While some clerics and religious advocacies claim the victory of Islam in all previous aeon, political Islam had failed to take place in Egypt. The dereliction of political Islam had reached the point of no return – conceivably – hitherto. The pragmatic dereliction of political Islam had bedaubed the truth of several aspects are concealed. Crucially, the pejorative claim of Egyptians to rebuff political Islam. This claim boggles unanswered questions that still seek an answer. For instance, how Egyptians rebuffed political Islam? Who incited the Egyptians against the Muslim Brotherhood? The answer to these questions brings a crucial question that still unanswered – Was Egyptians prepared for democracy beneath political Islam?

Historically, the word of democracy played no role in the Egyptians' accounts. It is an apocryphal story. Politically, Egypt had been ruled 60 years beneath the military rule from 1952 until 2011. Prior to the collapse of King Farouk in 1952, Egyptians were allowed to participate in the political field (Brooks, 2013).

Alas, the coup against the King had dissolved all political parties and consigned the political field to retrograde (Jankowski, 2002). However, in January 2011, Egyptians expressed their acrimony in a peaceful revolution on Egypt's soil and toppled the despot Mubarak, after 30 years of governing Egypt (Shahine, 2011). Still, in 2013, the military emerged again in the political scene and besmirched the democratic practice that Egyptian procured from the January Revolution. Conclusively, the military coup practised the pseudo-democracy and incarcerated all participants of January Revolution – and of course – the President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian inhabitants.

### **What is Political Islam?**

The definition of political Islam has an influx definition. Clerics, however, argued to establish one definition. Political Islam is an academic, political, and religious term. Political Islam had appeared in the political scene after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, 1923 (El-Basomi, 2020). Whilst other clerics define political Islam is the awareness of the rights. The rights of each individual of the state. It is the democracy and not the conspiracy and coups (Mahmoud, 1992). It is obscure why the Muslims countries failed to implement democracy as they claim political Islam is founded to entrench democracy and symposia. Still, Muslims rebuff the claim that Islam is in a current battle with the West. The word 'battle' brings two potentials, a winner, and a loser. Thus, they deliberate Islam should not be placed in the position of going into a battle. Yet, Islamists are in a battle of the West. Muslims correspondingly believe that the West will not provide the fortuitous for them to implement the political Islam agenda.

Another definition of political Islam emerged recently by Islamists, which is political Islam reckons as a theory such as communism and socialism ideology. The implementation of the theory needs plans, efforts, and sacrifices. On the one hand, Muslims themselves argue regarding political Islam. Indeed, those who rebuff political Islam assume that political Islam means Shari Law, or in other words, hudud, which means the implementation of Islamic rules in the society. For instance, the prohibition of intercourse before marriage and the cut of hands of artifice burglars (Brown, 2017). Antithesis from this assumption, political Islam advocacies argue that political Islam is not well explained. But the meaning of its concept has been besmirched by its dissenters. However, political Islam does not necessarily mean hudud. For this reason, the Muslim Brotherhood never declared its intention during the election programs to implement the Sharia Law or hudud. Albeit the movement's motto telling "Allah is our impartial. The Prophet is our leader. The Koran is our constitution. Jihad is our means. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope" (Vidino, 2005). The key understanding of political Islam by the Muslim Brotherhood is to reform the political and economic aspects through Islamic teachings. The salient point of political Islam through the Muslim Brotherhood perspective is to reform the society and the state (Pandian, Goma & Pazil, 2020). Fundamentally, this was the base of the Muslim Brotherhood, where the movement played the catalyst to change the Egyptian political scene. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood had preordained that Islam does not exist at mosques solely, but it is a system that includes all aspects of life (Harris, 1964) Thoroughly, the Muslim Brotherhood sought reform of politics through the political scops that emphasis on justice and equality for all Egyptians. Yet, the movement governed Egypt for a year. Still, the existence of Sharia Law and hudud was absent during the movement presidency (Pargeter, 2016). On the other side, the other Islamist movements urged the Muslim Brotherhood to implement the Sharia Law, which meant political Islam. Regrettably, the Sharia

Law call had been considered pejorative in the Muslim Brotherhood account. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood abnegated its willingness to implement the Sharia Law, but the movement contended on the trajectory of reform through an Islamic scope (Saleh, 2011). Furthermore, the movement defended its stance not to implement the Sharia Law as Egyptians were not religiously prepared to be ruled beneath the Sharia Law. Certainly, the abnegation of the Muslim Brotherhood against hudud had sapped its strength and beard abomination from Islamists towards Morsi as a president and his cohorts. Religiously, Sharia Law or hudud was ceased on several occasions. Umar Bin Khattab, the second Khalifah of Muslims, had ceased and suspended the hudud punishment when the number of poor increased (Kamali, 1998). Still, in Egypt, the number of poor was increasing during Hosni Mubarak aeon, the fourth Egyptian President. Profoundly, the Muslim Brotherhood had no plan to palliate the number of poor. At this juncture, Egypt recorded 30 million out of 80 million inhabitants beneath the poverty line (BBC, 2019). Of course, the Muslim Brotherhood was not responsible for that number of poor as the movement governed Egypt for a year solely. Nevertheless, the whole responsibility goes for the previous regimes of the military. In sum, it seemed elusive for the Muslim Brotherhood to implement the hudud whilst the political and religious awareness remained absent as well. In fact, hudud was not the favour that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to govern Egypt. Hudud does not mean political Islam in the Muslim Brotherhood's account. Then the movement worked diligently to bring democracy and freedom of speech to Egypt through an Islamic perspective. Therefore, Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood President, became a subject of mockery (Ashour, 2015). Besides, he had never incarcerated one of his political dissenters. Towards the end, the meaning of political Islam translated from one group to another and – certainly – the factor of timing plays a crucial role in understanding profoundly political Islam based on each group's perspective.

Hitherto, Egypt had several political Islam advocacies that draw the trajectory of political Islam gratifyingly accurate. For instance, Mohamed Abdu, the sheikh who graduated from Al-Azhar University. He continued his journey of learning in France, where he learned from Jamal Al-Afghani. Abdu seemed to seek performance in all Egyptian aspects. The education, politics, culture and Al-Azhar. He had been profoundly influenced by the European advancement (Misbah, 2015). In other words, Abdu stated, "In Europe, I found Islam but not Muslims, and in our countries the Middle East, I found Muslims and not Islam". Undeniably, Abdu has culturally influenced (Ali, 2017). He believed in involving Islam to reform the country based on Islamic teachings. At this juncture, the idea or Minhaj curriculum of Abdu met disavowal from Al-Azhar clerics. For them, Abdu's Minhaj is a heresy. The clerics rebuffed and criticised the man. Fundamentally, Al-Azhar clerics believed not to bring the religion on the political table. Alas, Abdu had vividly failed to cajole the clerics. Conveniently, the Minhaj of Abdu was not put on the margin, but in a continuum grapple for political Islam, many cohorts followed the same trajectory of Abdu and avowed his Minhaj. Crucially, Hassan Al-Banna.

Hassan Al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher was born in Egypt in 1906 Al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, the most influential Islamic organisation in the world (Siva, Gomaa & Pazil, 2020). Albeit Al-Banna had not met Mohamed Abdu personally, but he seemed to affirm the trajectory of Abdu. He claimed for both Islam and politics to be followed as one constitutes in the Egyptian political scene. Thus, he promulgated his idea that Islam and politics are inseparable in mosques, cafes and social clubs (Munson, 2011). As a result, Al-Azhar clerics had reluctantly ceased Al-Banna to promulgate his idea in the mosques due to two reasons. Firstly, Al-Banna did not graduate from Al-Azhar University, but Cairo

University, which lacked his Islamic knowledge as the clerics claimed. Secondly, his age, as Al-Banna commenced his da'wah in his early twentieth. Of course, he became a subject of mockery (Ismail 2010) Still, Al-Banna with his cohorts had successfully entered the Egyptian political scene. They also established hundreds of branches in all diameters of Egypt. In fact, Al-Banna played on the stage of nationalism alongside the religion. Profoundly, most Egyptians at that time were beneath the colonialism from the ubiquitous influence of the British occupation. Furthermore, most of the politicians who grappled with the British occupation were liberalists and communists. Thus far, it was a new phenomenon for Egyptians to see Islam encouraging them to grapple the British occupation. For this reason, Al-Banna procured thousands of cohorts who ultimately understood that the jihad against the British occupation is a part and – indubitably – duty in Islam (Abdulhalim, 1979). However, Al-Banna inculcated into his cohorts that Islamic teachings must be implemented in society. The main objective of Al-Banna to socialise his cohorts on the Islamic teachings that also emphasises politics. For this reason, Al-Banna established religious schools, social clubs, and mosques (Munson, 2001) In his account, to prepare his members on political Islam, they have to be socialised in groups and individuals on that concept. Therefore, Al-Banna wrote several books and instituted a newspaper that focused on political Islam. Conclusively, Al-Banna had a plan to implement political Islam in consecutive degrees. Firstly, by the individual. Al-Banna believed that the individual is the most important part of the society who can morph society based on Islamic teachings, which leads to a society ruled by political Islam. Secondly, Al-Banna alleged that the individual able to recruit his family to become members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, they will learn the Islamic teachings through the Muslim Brotherhood perspective. Thirdly, Al-Banna, in his books, stated that political Islam needs religious motivation to take place in people's accounts, and thus he assumed that the COMMUNITY is the third part of the political Islam that comes after the family. Ultimately, Al-Banna emphasised the state, where political power is tangible, and political thoughts can physically be implemented (Bayoumi, 1992). To conclude, this has been described in the Muslim Brotherhood curriculum as Ustazitul Alam, which means to govern the world. Moreover, this so-called reform of the state by Islamic teachings should come gradually, not in a radical move (Banna, 1939).

The general theory of political Islam is profoundly described in the Muslim Brotherhood dictionary. Yet, the absence of the other Islamic movements in the political discourse has a shred of evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood is the sole Islamic movement that has politically a vivid plan to implement its agenda. On the contrary, it is pliable that the Muslim Brotherhood possibly has the ascendancy to recruit and play an influential role in the Egyptian political scene.

Whilst the other Islamic movements in Egypt have no historical experience that described their political Islam agenda. The fact that the January Revolution was a glimmer of hope that had provided the emancipation to all political parties to practice politics without censorship rather finite. Nevertheless, most of the Islamic advocacies who were ostracised in the society and incarcerated reckoned the January Revolution as the gate of Freedom of Speech and a new aeon for the political practice, albeit they were not politically prepared to understand political Islam. Profoundly, most Islamic movements rebuffed the idea of political discourse with the regime. Jamaat Islamiyah, for instance, had not practised politics or the political discourse with the regime. The movement was also an intruder guest in the Egyptian society due to its wide-ranging affiliation of assassinating Al-Sadat, the third Egyptian President, in 1981 (Kahana, & Stivi-Kerbis, 2014). However, the Jamaat Islamiyah developed its agenda and established a political party Building and

Development Party. The party boded to spread the awareness of political Islam (Carnegie, 2011). For Egyptians, the party was reckoned with extremism due to its violence against the Mubarak and Sadat regime.

### **The Dereliction of Political Islam**

The dereliction of political Islam does not mean the failure of Islam. Whilst the Muslim Brotherhood failed after a year of governing Egypt several Islamic groups failed the Muslim Brotherhood plan. For instance, Al-Azhar and Salafi. Both promptly endorsed the military coup and disowned the Muslim Brotherhood (Housden, 2013). Furthermore, they encouraged the Egyptian military to disperse the set-in of the Muslim Brotherhood supporters at Rabaa Square. As a result, the number of Rabaa victims reached thousands of martyrs (Abdelaziz, 2019). But the main issue that occurred consequently after Rabaa was that the Egyptian society bifurcated into two groups, stalwarts and nationalists who support the country and quislings who represented by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Sum, the Muslim Brotherhood became ostracised and subjected to incarceration and unfair trails (al-Anani, 2015). However, the main understanding of political Islam through the Muslim Brotherhood between 2012 and 2013 revolved around democracy. The movement sought the reform of Egyptians to have an in-depth understanding of the new aeon of democracy. The challenge at this juncture was the fast-changing that occurred in Egyptian society (Khalil, 2012). All Egyptians consciously understood their new rights in the country. Unsurprisingly, the Muslim Brotherhood objected to govern the country as a whole. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood governed Egypt as a country, not as a state apparatus (al-Anani, 2015). To be sure, the previous regime of Mubarak instigated several obstacles that had extremely influenced the Muslim Brotherhood reputation. The lack of need-supplies witnessed the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood government. Correspondingly, Morsi, as a president, claimed that the previous regime of Mubarak is behind the economic crisis. Alas, the response of Morsi towards this crisis had just increased the acrimony towards him. Meanwhile, the Egyptian media had shifted from the support side to stand wholly against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. At this time, the Muslim Brotherhood called for political discourse with all comrades of the January Revolution to stand against the supremacy of the previous regime of Mubarak. Regrettably, liberalists, secularists, communists and several groups of Islamists rebuffed the political discourse with Morsi. As a result, Morsi alongside, the Muslim Brotherhood, was placed in a vortex situation (Ranko, 2014). For them, the political atmosphere reached the point of no return. On the contrary, the supporters of Islamists had politically embarrassed the Muslim Brotherhood. They called for jihad in Syria against the Syrian regime. They also called for vindictiveness against Morsi's dissenters (France24, 2013). Apparently, the Muslim Brotherhood planned to bring democracy for all Egyptians, but the call of Morsi's supporters beneath the cover of legitimacy had worsened the political situation, which later transmitted into violence and abomination.

### **Violence and Political Discourse**

The plan of democracy beneath political Islam was reputable to bring prosperity, not violence. Thus, was Egyptians prepared for democracy after sixty years of dictatorship? The answer to this question seemed to be "NO" for several reasons. Crucially, the unexpected uprising of politicians on the political field witnessed their weakness against the Muslim Brotherhood. The dissenters of the Muslim Brotherhood failed to obtain the majority of the People's Assembly election, besides the Presidential election. Undoubtedly, the Muslim

Brotherhood practices politics for more than 90 years, and the movement still coherent and intact. The movement had ample political experience to success and procure all electoral entitlements (al-Anani, 2016). This seemed not in favour of the movement's dissenters. The word – Democracy – is explicitly not felicitous for Egyptians. This conservatism encouraged the dissenters of the Muslim Brotherhood to rebuff the democratic trajectory and condescend to violence. The upbraid and abomination towards the Muslim Brotherhood shifted to physical destruction (Shahin, 2015). The movement headquarter, besides its interests, were burned and damaged. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood was in power, but it failed to cease the acrimony and abomination. The pursuit of coaxing the dissenters to sit on the political table was not truly accepted (Housden, 2013). The political dissenters called Morsi to step down, albeit he has not governed Egypt for more than eight months. At the same time, the political elites joined the dissenters and rebuffed the catered offers by the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a civilian government.

Sociologically, the Egyptian inhabitants had procured several advantages from the Muslim Brotherhood. For instance, 1,9 million employees benefited from the increase in the minimum wage. 1.2 million teachers benefited from the minimum wage. Furthermore, the number of women who benefited from health insurance reached 498,000 women, besides 13 million children benefited from health insurance. Most importantly, more than 67 million inhabitants benefited from food subsidies. Politically, Morsi has declared complete amnesty for all political prisoners who incarcerated during the January Revolution. Morsi also called for the cease of the military court against the civilians (Aljazeera, 2013). Meaningfully, Morsi alongside, the Muslim Brotherhood, pursued to place Egypt on the democratic trajectory. Both had a plan to co-opt with the internal political pressure to attain the goals of the January Revolution. Alas, the voice of the Muslim Brotherhood was called in a sotto-voce. On the contrary, the political dissenters, with their media and violence, had successfully boded the democratic trajectory.

The failure of political Islam was not going to occur without the salient role of the Egyptian media, which putatively propagated false news against the Muslim Brotherhood government. The media focused on constant bickering that favoured nowt for Egyptians, but unfairness against the Muslim Brotherhood (Grim, & Harders, 2018). The fake news augmented the abomination towards the Muslim Brotherhood. The abomination had intensely provided the acceptability for Egyptians to kill and annihilate the Muslim Brotherhood interests. The same scenario that occurred in Rwanda when the Hutu's media inveigled the Hutus to kill their own Tutsis' neighbours and family members (Hamelink, 2008). That scenario led to the most atrocious massacre in Rwandan history, which instigated more than nearly a million victims. The Muslim Brotherhood vehemently abnegated the alleged abomination against it. The movement focused on developing Egypt. At the same time, the voice of dissenters considered a constituent of freedom of expression.

Profoundly, the political dissenters of the Muslim Brotherhood were predominately unfortunate with the uprising of political Islam. Therefore, they rebuffed the democracy that brought the Islamists. Still, the Muslim Brotherhood had constantly challenged the allegation that the movement will bring dictatorship to Egypt, not democracy (Tadros, 2012). Arguably, the violence of political dissenters was a shred of evidence that Egypt does not deserve democracy. The dissenters of Morsi stood against the democracy that brought Islamists. Thus, this has remarked the lack of understanding of the current political environment in Egypt. Egyptians, however, had not stood beside the Muslim Brotherhood in this political battle. As such, the abomination towards the Muslim Brotherhood translated to a massive demonstration on 30 June 2013 (Pratt,

& Rezk, 2019). Of course, as a part of the democratic trajectory, the demonstration never ceased. It had witnessed the existence of the Egyptian police and military against Morsi. As a result, the police encouraged the demonstrators to demolish the Muslim Brotherhood interests. It was extremely elucidating that the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood will occur within a few days. On 3 July, the Minister of Defence, Abdel Fattah Sisi, betrayed Morsi and committed the second military coup in Egyptian history (Abul-Magd, 2013).

The learned lesson of the military coup agitated the Muslim Brotherhood members against their leaders, who assumed that Sisi stands beside Morsi against the demonstrators. Yet, the assumption was erroneous. Paradoxically, the military detained Morsi and killed hundreds of the Muslim Brotherhood members in the street. Still, the military called for political discourse with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Islamists and those who believed in democracy bewailed the coup. For them, Egypt was consigned to the point of no return, and thus, they do not trust the military to demand for political discourse. The Muslim Brotherhood also demanded the international community to stand beside the legitimacy of Morsi. Nevertheless, this never occurred. The Muslim Brotherhood reckoned as a terrorist Islamic movement. The main issue of that military coup was that the revolutionists who toppled Hosni Mubarak welcomed the military coup that besmirched the Egyptian democracy. They also welcomed the suppression against the Muslim Brotherhood members. Ultimately, Sisi hurled the revolutionists alongside the ultra's movements into the incarcerations. This was politically a punishment for each individual who participated in the January Revolution.

## **Discussion**

The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has remarkably influenced political Islam worldwide. It is incomprehensible for Islamist sociologists to understand the dereliction of the Muslim Brotherhood. Albeit the movement has ample experience to rule Egypt. On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood does not represent political Islam solely. But the intermediate Islam that fights extremism. The Muslim Brotherhood does not accept that it failed to govern Egypt. The movement assumes that it could not control the state apparatus. Thus, there have been several governmental sectors that rebuffed the cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood government. Palpably, Egypt police considered as a torture tool in Mubarak's hand. The police ultimately stroked to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood government. The police used to torture the Islamists during Sadat and Mubarak aeon. Therefore, to work beneath the Muslim Brotherhood government seemed elusive to happen. Meanwhile, the military that promised Egyptians not to be biased has completely committed a coup and killed thousands of Egyptians since 2013 hitherto. Furthermore, the comrades of the January Revolution rebuffed to establish a civilian government to work with Morsi. In fact, this all has been the commence of the Muslim Brotherhood collapse.

Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood played a role in helping the community in terms of poverty and social-economic. The movement had more than 100 unprofitable organisations that helped the community during Mubarak's aeon. Mubarak, however, welcomed the social role of the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet, he had a constant dispute with the Muslim Brotherhood role in politics. Thus, he used two methods of approaches towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Firstly, Mubarak left the social emancipation for the Muslim Brotherhood to distribute the daily needs for Egyptians. Albeit there was an Islamic agenda behind the distribution, which emerged during the parliament elections particularly in 2005 when the Muslim Brotherhood procured 88 chairs in the parliament. Ultimately, there was a rigours censorship towards the political activities of the

Muslim Brotherhood (Harnisch, & Mecham, 2009). To conclude, the Muslim Brotherhood probably has political experience as an opponent movement, but it failed in a year as a government.

Despite the hardworking effort of the Muslim Brotherhood to implement its political agenda, the concept of democracy was abstruse among Egyptians. There had been an absent role of the state to disseminate the awareness of democracy after the January Revolution. At this juncture, the political condition was not stable. Moreover, most of the workers, revolutionists, and other categories of society demonstrated their own interest. As a result, this had instigated an internal crisis for Morsi and his government. The only solution to build a coherent society was through political discourse, which never occurred due to the dispute between Islamists and their dissenters. However, was the Muslim Brotherhood prepared to govern Egypt and to implement political Islam?

The Muslim Brotherhood in the year of 2012-2013 never implemented political Islam, whether politically rather propagating for the concept on its media. The movement was placed in a constant dispute from the media, political dissenters, and the military. The Muslim Brotherhood established a plan called 'Nahda' renaissance to improve the education, health system, and to enhance individual income. Alas, the abortive plan occurred due to the internal political crisis. Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood understood that Egyptians would welcome them as the majority of Egyptians are Muslims. Yet, most of whom stood against the Muslim Brotherhood from the first day of government were Muslims. Indubitably, the Muslim Brotherhood had not conducted a study regarding the current sociological situation in Egypt. Which means, were all Egyptians prepared to work with the Muslim Brotherhood? Of course, Morsi won the presidential election with 51%, while the other candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, procured 49%. This explains that not all Egyptians were biased to elect the Muslim Brotherhood. Prior to the election, the Muslim Brotherhood nominated Khairat El-Shater as the presidential candidate. Alas, the Supreme Election Commission rejected his papers. Conclusively, the Muslim Brotherhood nominated Morsi instead of El-Shater. However, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that those against them rebuff their agenda by-elections or a peaceful approach. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to understand the abomination that was inculcated by the media. Sociologically, media is a crucial agent among the four agents of socialisation 'family, school, peers and media' (Siva, Gomaa, & Pazil). The individual learns from the media, and thus, the media could reshape the individual's personality. Hence, the Egyptian media, mostly the talk-shows, admonished Egyptians to demonstrate against the Muslim Brotherhood. It is vivid that the political dissenters were berated. They managed successfully to transform this acrimony as a coup toppled the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi.

The literature accentuates that the dereliction of political Islam never occurred during the Muslim Brotherhood government. According to literature, the Muslim Brotherhood constrained the governmental offices solely. Yet, the state of apparatus was completely constrained by the military and the previous regime of Mubarak. Thus, it is academically prejudicial to declare that political Islam failed in Egypt. Unambiguously, the failure had solely occurred with the Muslim Brotherhood, who failed to ascertain the internal crisis in Egyptian society that led to the collapse of the movement. The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood witnessed the failure of democracy, the political process and freedom of expression. As such, this article come to an agreement that political Islam was not implemented to fail. But the Muslim Brotherhood who failed to govern Egypt.

Since the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood hitherto, Egyptians live in a dismal atmosphere where there

is no voice for political dissenters. Even though the political dissenters who toppled Morsi remain behind bars. The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood is a sign that those who called for democracy never welcomed it when it brought the Islamists. The collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood witnessed the failure of democracy, the political process and freedom of expression.

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